Perjury Lawsuit against attorney Deborah K. Garvin

...

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, EAST COUNTY DIVISION

MAURA LARKINS,
Plaintiff,

vs.


MICHAEL CARLSON,
DEBORAH K. GARVIN
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendants.

                       __

Law Enforcement

San Diego
Education Report Blog

Email:
sandiegoedreport@cox.net

Published by
Maura Larkins

A. THIS CASE IS ABOUT CRYSTAL-CLEAR PERJURY

This case is about a felony committed to cover up a misdemeanor.
Defendants created a false document stating that MICHAEL CARLSON
committed ZERO illegal CLETS searches for plaintiff in the effort to prove that
he did not use an illegally obtained record of an arrest to destroy plaintiff’s
career, reputation and livelihood.

Defendant GARVIN states (Demurrer, page 1, lines19-21), “Plaintiff’s action is
much ado about an “and” and an “or”; a conjunctive v. disjunctive typographical
error which had absolutely no bearing on a previous civil action between plaintiff
and defendant Michael Carlson.”

On the contrary, plaintiff’s action is about a declaration (Exhibit 1), every
word of which was written for one purpose—to deceive. The declaration’s
intent was to perpetrate a fraud on the Superior Court of San Diego by
creating a false document to be signed under penalty of perjury by an
official representative of the Sheriff of the County of Santa Barbara.

B. THIS CASE CONCERNS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ZERO
(CLETS SEARCHES) AND EIGHT (CLETS SEARCHES)

In his deposition, Sam Gross, without hesitation, testified that HIS OWN
DECLARATION was FALSE.

Defendants have admitted their intent in identical demurrers filed in the present
action. They state (demurrer, p. 2; lines 24-25), “The declaration was intended
to show that Carlson did not access the CLETS system and therefore could not
have known of plaintiff’s criminal history.” (CLETS is the acronym for the
CALIFORNIA LAW ENFORCEMENT TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM.)
Thus, GARVIN and CARLSON admit that they intended to make the court believe
something that the attached audits did not support in the least. The declaration in
question contained NO audits of searches for “maura” or “larkins” as it claimed,
only audits for “maura” and “larkins.” The word “or” was necessary achieve the
admitted purpose of the declaration, and was not a “typographical error.”
Although the word “or” was a critical part of the hoax perpetrated on the court in
San Diego Superior Court, it was by no means the only deception in the
declaration.

Missing audits are further proof that GARVIN and CARLSON intended to deceive
the court. The audit documents included by defendants (labeled as “exhibit A”
within the Amended Declaration, which is attached as Exhibit 1) were carefully
designed to fool the judge and cover up EIGHT searches that had occurred.
Sheriff’s representative Sam Gross admitted during his deposition on November
4, 2004, that the declaration he had signed was false. Mr. Gross agreed to
conduct and report the results of the audits that had been written about, but not
included, in his declaration. Weeks later, Mr. Gross sent a letter (Exhibit 2)
stating that there had actually been EIGHT (8) searches for “maura” or “larkins”
of the CLETS database.

C. CARLSON’S MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS
WAS DECIDED AFTER THE COURT WAS PRESENTED
WITH THE FALSE DECLARATION OF THE SHERIFF OF
SANTA BARBARA

Defendants’ assertion that the perjured declaration of the Sheriff of Santa
Barbara’s representative had no effect on the judge in San Diego Superior Court
case number GIC 781970 is preposterous. The judge would not expect a false
declaration from the representative of the Sheriff of Santa Barbara County.
Contrary to GARVIN’s claim, the declaration had a huge bearing on the previous
civil action between plaintiff and defendant Michael Carlson. As a result of the
perjured declaration, and other abuses of the justice system by defendants and
the eight law firms that worked together against plaintiff, plaintiff’s case against
Carlson was thrown out.

Defendants are confident that they can, in this case, repeat their past success in
deceiving the San Diego Superior Court. Defendants use the phrase “plaintiff’s
criminal history” (demurrer, p. 2; lines 24-25), despite the fact that plaintiff has
no criminal history. Plaintiff never committed a crime nor was she ever charged
with a crime. The fact that plaintiff does not have a criminal history is
precisely the reason that CARLSON’s acquisition and distribution of
information in the false police report was a criminal act. (LABOR CODE
§432.7(g) (1) (a misdemeanor) states: “No peace officer or employee of a law
enforcement agency with access to criminal offender record information
maintained by a local law enforcement criminal justice agency shall knowingly
disclose, with intent to affect a person’s employment, any information contained
therein pertaining to an arrest or detention or proceeding that did not result in a
conviction…” The wish to conceal CARLSON’s criminal act is the reason that
defendants suborned perjury.

D. LARKINS WOULD HAVE WON HER SUPERIOR
COURT CASE IF IT HAD NOT BEEN THROWN OUT

To their shame, defendants continue to deny (identical demurrers, page 2 lines
15-16) that CARLSON knew anything of plaintiff before he was sued. The
evidence proves not only that he knew about her, but had committed a
crime against her long before she knew of his existence.

It should be noted that for a considerable time, CARLSON tried to make
plaintiff believe that his innocent brother was in fact the guilty party.
Gretchen Donndelinger, principal of Castle Park Elementary School
(who was not at all supportive of plaintiff), revealed the truth about
CARLSON in her deposition (Exhibit 3):

) Case No.            GIE 034328
) Judge:                Eddie Sturgeon
) Dept:                 14
) Date:                  February 16, 2007
)
) OPPOSITION TO DEMURRER OF
) DEFENDANT DEBORAH K. GARVIN
)
)
)
)
)

Opposition to Defendants' Demurrers filed Feb. 5, 2007

The office of the
Sheriff of Santa
Barbara did not
want Michael
Carlson working in
its information
center after it
discovered he had
committed multiple
crimes there.

Carlson was
transferred to
patrol duty.

But the sheriff
committed perjury
to cover up
Carlson's crime
from outsiders.
Clearly, the sheriff
is interested in
protecting insiders,
not the people on
the outside, the
people who pay for
the sheriff's
protection from
crime.

Perjury was rampant in
this case. It was
committed by Richard
Werlin, the Assistant
Superintendent for
Human Resources, Gina
Boyd, the president of
Chula Vista Educators,
Robin Donlan, Michael
Carlson's sister, and
others.

Maura Larkins' Perjury Complaint
A Public Interest Lawsuit

01/29/08
Update:
Neither Sharon
Jones nor Randolph
Ward ever
responded to
Larkins' public
records request.

02/07/07
SDCOE member
Sharon Jones is
currently helping her
constituent Larkins
with her public
records request
regarding the
amount of payments
made to Dan Shinoff
and/or his law firm by
SDCOE-JPA in this
case and other
cases.
(At least, we hope
and believe that
Jones is working on
this problem. In the
past, SDCOE has
simply forwarded
such requests to
Shinoff, who
routinely denies
them.
We hope for a response
from current
SDCOE-JPA top
administrator Randy
Ward any day now.

Gabriel G. Hedrick
supposedly prepared the
identical motions filed by
Garvin (and copied and
filed by Carlson) in this
case.

But Gabriel Hedrick left
the firm of McCormick
and Mitchell (where
Garvin is a partner) at
about the same time as
these motions were filed.
Gabe Hedrick went to
Handal & Associates in
San Diego. Hedrick's new
law firm refused to state
to plaintiff on March 5,
2007 whether or not
Hedrick works for them,
until she said that the Bar
Association website
indicates that he does.
Handal & Associates then
admitted the truth.

What's the story here?
Perhaps Hedrick and his
new firm are
embarrassed by his role
in this case.

Perjury in America

Who is Deborah Garvin's
lawyer?

L ink: perjury complaint
& documents proving
perjury

"A police officer comes to the witness stand clothed with the
authority of the State. His official status gives him credibility and
creates a far greater potential for harm than exists when the
average citizen testifies."

"The fact that
plaintiff does NOT
have a criminal
history is precisely
the reason that
CARLSON’s
acquisition and
distribution of
information in the
false police report
was a criminal act."

The crime committed
by defendants is
particularly harmful to
the public good because
it involved two law
enforcement officers.

In his dissent in Briscoe
v. LaHUE, Justice
Marshall stated:

"A police officer comes
to the witness stand
clothed with the
authority of the State.
His official status gives
him credibility and
creates a far greater
potential for harm than
exists when the average
citizen testifies. The
situation is aggravated
when the official draws
on special expertise. A
policeman testifying
about a fingerprint
identification or a
medical examiner
testifying as to the cause
of a death can have a
critical impact on a
defendant's trial. At the
same time, the threat of
a criminal perjury
prosecution, which
serves as an important
constraint on the
average witness'
testimony, is virtually
nonexistent in the
police-witness context.
Despite the apparent
prevalence of police
perjury, prosecutors
exhibit extreme [460
U.S. 325, 366]
reluctance in charging
police officials with
criminal conduct because
of their need to maintain
close working
relationships with law
enforcement agencies.
The majority thus
forecloses a civil sanction
in precisely those
situations where the
need is most pressing."

Q.         (page 80, lines 19-25) Did Robin Colls [AKA Robin Donlan] ever
share with you any kind of information concerning a police report allegedly,
somehow, involving Maura Larkins?
A.        Actually, that did come up at some point when she [Robin
Colls/Donlan] was talking, but she, herself, said, you know, you don’t want to
hear anything about that. And I’m not going to tell you. I know that there is
something, but I have no clue what it is. She didn’t want me to know.
Q.        So she said there’s something in the police report?
A.          It was a personal thing.
Q.           Involving something that was a non-school matter but that Robin
Colls was aware of?
A.          Uh-huh.
Q.          Was that a yes?
A.          Yes, I do recall hearing something like that. I have no details
whatsoever.
Q.          Was this in a face-to-face conversation with Robin Colls?
A.          Yes.
Q.          And what year was that?
A.          That was the year, I think she told me about that this year, the year—
Q.          2002?
A.          Two—1999, 2000 school year. It was the year before.
Q.          That this occurred?
A.          It occurred in the 1999, 2000 school year.
Q.          But you found out about it in which year.
A.          There was an incident that this is referring to in my belief. They had a
problem with a staff member the year before and—that’s what I understood
this to mean anyway.
Q.         Exhibit 19? (Exhibit 4 in current action)
A.          (Page 82 lines 1-25:) Yes. It happened in 1999, September. It was
like the first week back from vacation. That’s when that happened, and, I
believe, that’s when Robin told me that there was an incident, there was a
personal, a side incident, but she said you don’t want to know about it. And I
said no, it’s personal, doesn’t have anything to do with school, I don’t want to
know.
Q.        And she told you it involved some sort of police report or law
enforcement report?
A.        I think so, yes.
Q.        Did you ask her how she knew that?
A.        Uh-uh.
Q.        No?
A.        That was it. That’s all she said. She said I have this thing going on
with her on the side. Outside of school. You don’t want to know about it.
Q.        Was it an indication that she had it going on, that it was something
personal?
A.        It was a personal issue outside of school going on with Maura and her
somehow, and I don’t know if it was her or her family or—but that was it.
That’s all she said.
Q.        Did Ms. Colls, rather, leave you with the impression that it was going
on—that somehow, Ms. Colls was actually involved in this personal incident?
A.        That she or her family, you know, she knows about it or it was—
something else going on outside of school, (Page 83, lines 1-8:) something to
do with Robin and or her family and Maura. I don’t know even why I
remember that. Somehow somebody told me, and I think it was Robin.
Q.        It had something to do with either Robin or a family member of Robin’
s?
A.        Yeah. I think if it was actually Robin I probably would have wanted to
know, just natural curiosity. I don’t think it was against her. I think it was a
family member.

Thus, Carlson knew of plaintiff’s existence long before she knew of his
existence. Unbeknownst to plaintiff, Carlson and his sister, Robin Colls (AKA
Robin Donlan), had made plaintiff a matter of considerable discussion in the
teacher’s lounge and the school district office in September of 2000.

E.         CARLSON INCLUDED THE PERJURED
DECLARATION OF SAM GROSS IN HIS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

When the court read the declaration of the Sheriff of Santa Barbara, the court
must have become convinced that plaintiff had no chance of winning. This
belief, though incorrect, was certainly created by the false declaration of the
representative of the Sheriff of Santa Barbara, the very declaration that is at
the heart of the current litigation.

Of course the judge assumed that the declaration of the Sheriff of Santa
Barbara was true. By submitting the perjured declaration, Defendant
Deborah Garvin fooled the Superior Court in case number GIC 781970.
F. DEFENDANTS WITHDREW THEIR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SO
PLAINTIFF HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE THAT IT CONTAINED A
PERJURED DECLARATION

It is shameful that defendants mention their Request for Summary Judgment,
when they themselves withdrew this motion before Plaintiff could respond to
it. Without this document, and the Request for Summary Judgment in which it
was filed, the court would not have made the decision it did. Plaintiff was
never allowed to file her Opposition to Request for Summary Judgment
(Exhibit 5).
CARLSON and GARVIN did not retract their false declaration even after Sam
Gross declared it to be false, because that would have destroyed their
defense. Their defense depended entirely on obstruction, intimidation, and
dishonesty. Instead, GARVIN withdrew her Motion for Summary Judgment,
specifically requesting that the court NOT make a decision, so that plaintiff
would have no opportunity to submit proof that Sam Gross’s declaration was
false.

G.   EIGHT LAW FIRMS [including Stutz, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz,
the law firm that represented current Chula Vista mayor Cheryl Cox, and
fellow CVESD board members Pamela Smith, Patrick Judd, Bertha
Lopez, and Larry Cunningham, and was financed by Daniel Shinoff friend
Diane Crosier, director of the SDCOE-JPA ] MADE SURE THAT
JUSTICE DID NOT PREVAIL

Plaintiff, a third-grade teacher, did not obtain justice because EIGHT LAW
FIRMS were determined to avoid a just outcome for her case. Terminating
Sanctions were granted against plaintiff simply because she could not keep up
with the eight law firms working against her.

H. JUDGE NEVITT REVEALED THE REASON FOR THE
TERMINATING SANCTIONS WAS PLAINTIFF’S
FAILURE TO FILE A MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE
ORDER

Judge Nevitt states on page 2 of his decision granting Terminating Sanctions:

"Although plaintiff does not make the argument,
plaintiff’s departure from her deposition on
November 11, 2004, may have been a suspension of
the deposition arguably pursuant to CCP section
2025(n) [see 11/11/04 rough transcript, p. 107;10-12 in plaintiff’s Exh. 1, and p. 15:
11-13 in defendant Donlans’s and Watson’s Exh. M]; but plaintiff did not
continue the procedure under section 2025(n) to
seek a protective order. (Exhibit 6, page 2)

Here is the passage to which the court refers:
[Plaintiff] “I believe I need to suspend this
deposition at this time and talk to the court about
whether or not I have a right to act as my own
counsel during my deposition.” (Exhibit 7)

It is absurd to claim that plaintiff was unwilling to ask for a protective order
against discovery abuse by defendants. Obviously, plaintiff would not
intentionally fail to seek a protective order to which she is entitled. Plaintiff
was merely unable to keep up with eight large law firms working against her
in two different cases. Eight law firms with multiple lawyers buried a third-
grade teacher under motion after motion, all the while committing violations
and abuses of discovery law. Plaintiff was simply unable to keep up with the
discovery abuse of eight law firms. Lawyers in different cases demanded to
depose her on the same day.

I. AGAIN AND AGAIN, DEFENDANTS AND DEFENDANT
WITNESSES WALKED OUT OF DEPOSITIONS

Ironically, just one day before plaintiff’s momentous November 11, 2004
deposition, co-defendants’ lawyer Kelly Angell walked out of the Scharmach
deposition, and ordered Ms. S to leave (Exhibit 8, page 174 lines 15-19):

QUESTION:            Ms. S, did you feel that I was right not to
bow to injustice when I was wrongfully removed
from my classroom in Chula Vista Elementary;

MS. ANGELL:         Objection. Argumentative.
Let’s go, Mrs. S. We’re done.

At that point, Kelly Angell walked out, and Mrs. Scharmach followed her.
Angell’s law firm, Stutz, Artiano, Shinoff & Holtz, clearly believe that lawyers
for a school district have carte blanche to ignore the law.   The behavior of
Kelly Angell (AKA Minnehan) was manipulative and deceitful when she got the
court to order a deposition date for plaintiff when she knew plaintiff wouldn’t
be able to attend. Angell started out by getting a court order for a deposition
on October 28, 2004, knowing that plaintiff was going to be deposed in
another case the next day. Nevertheless, plaintiff wrote back and agreed to
the date (Exhibit 9). The date was agreed to, set in writing, so naturally
plaintiff assumed Angell would not continue her ex parte quest for a
deposition date. Shamefully, Angell did go to the judge, without plaintiff’s
knowledge, and asked for the agreed-upon deposition date to be changed to
the ONE DAY, OCTOBER 25, 2004, when she knew plaintiff would be
unavailable. Plaintiff came to her deposition for as long as she could on that
date.

Angell also got a protective order against all discovery based simply on the
fact that discovery is just too troublesome for school districts. Plaintiff, on
the other hand, produced hundreds of documents, and answered hundreds of
interrogatories. Kelly Angell wouldn’t answer any interrogatories until eight
months after plaintiff asked for CARLSON’s address—after plaintiff had spent
hundreds of dollars on a private detective and already knew the address—at
which time Angell answered one interrogatory about Carlson’s address.

Defendant Chula Vista Educators President Gina Boyd’s lawyer, Michael Hersh
unilaterally declared that her deposition was finished. Boyd said that she
gave her notes of meetings concerning plaintiff to her lawyer, who then
helped Boyd explain that she might have accidentally thrown away (!) the
notes (for a meeting that would prove she committed perjury), or they might
have been lost (in the lawyer’s office). Michael Hersh also prepared a
declaration for Boyd to sign. The declaration attempted to explain what
happened to the notes (Exhibit 15).

J. WHY DID DEFENDANTS ABUSE DISCOVERY?

Defendant attorney Kelly Angell obligingly explained, on
December 31, 2002, why she would not answer plaintiff’s
interrogatories:

“I can’t answer them. I just can’t. I can’t answer
them and protect my client”

(Exhibit 10). This is clearly the reason for all the discovery avoidance by
defendants.

K. CARLSON NEVER SUBMITTED TO A DEPOSITION
OR ANY OTHER DISCOVERY

GARVIN asked the court to excuse CARLSON from discover without offering
any reason why he should be exempted. CARLSON never submitted to a
deposition. GARVIN simply refused to comply with discovery requests.

L. DEFENDANTS CONTINUE TO TRY TO CONFUSE THE COURT IN THIS CASE

Defendants are trying to confuse the issue at hand by stating (identical
demurrers, page 3 line 26-27), “[Sheriff’s representative Sam] Gross
revealed, however, “None of the names disclosed [in CLETS audits] was
Maura and Larkins connected as a first and last name.”” Defendants’
statement is true, but only because there is no CLETS record for Maura
Larkins. Why the cover-up of the two audits revealing the eight searches?
Why did Sam Gross not reveal in his letter, as he had promised to do, whether
or not CARLSON had conducted any or all of the eight searches? The point of
the audits was NOT to see whose CLETS records came up in past searches,
but to see WHO HAD CONDUCTED THOSE SEARCHES. When Sheriff’s
representative Sam Gross wrote the November 24, 2004 letter (Exhibit 2),
he had the identification number/s of the person/s who conducted those eight
searches, but did not reveal them. Why not? Instead, Gross tried to confuse
the issue by talking about the fact that Plaintiff’s name does not show up in a
CLETS search, and by saying he couldn’t reveal the names of anyone whose
history had come up. It’s long past time for the Sheriff of Santa Barbara to
reveal whether CARLSON made any or all of those eight (8) searches for
“maura” or “larkins.”

II. THIS IS A PUBLIC INTEREST LAWSUIT

A. THE LITIGATION PRIVILEGE GOVERNED BY CIVIL
CODE SECTION 47 SERIOUSLY UNDERMINES THE
JUSTICE SYSTEM

Plaintiff’s complaint concerns a public policy that runs counter to, and
seriously undermines, the basic purpose of our legal system. Current
public policy allows individuals to sue for damages
caused by every crime in the book—except one.

That crime is perjury.

B. ONE CENTURY’S JUDICIAL DISSENT IS ANOTHER CENTURY’S ACCEPTED
LAW

Plaintiff asks that her complaint be considered in the light of dissenting
opinions in Briscoe v. LaHUE (Exhibit 11). Law and case law as explicated in
these dissents require that defendant’s demurrer be overruled.

The crime committed by defendants is particularly harmful to the public good
because it involved two law enforcement officers. In his dissent in Briscoe v.
LaHUE, Justice Marshall stated:

A police officer comes to the witness stand clothed with the authority of
the State.

His official status gives him credibility and creates a far greater
potential for harm than exists when the average citizen testifies.

The situation is aggravated when the official draws on special expertise.
A policeman testifying about a fingerprint identification or a medical
examiner testifying as to the cause of a death can have a critical impact
on a defendant's trial.

At the same time, the threat of a criminal perjury prosecution, which
serves as an important constraint on the average witness' testimony, is
virtually nonexistent in the police-witness context.

Despite the apparent prevalence of police perjury, prosecutors exhibit
extreme [460 U.S. 325, 366] reluctance in charging police officials
with criminal conduct because of their need to maintain close working
relationships with law enforcement agencies.

The majority thus forecloses a civil sanction in precisely those situations
where the need is most pressing.

C. A WRONGFUL ACTION THAT CAUSES DAMAGE TO ANOTHER,
WHETHER CIVIL OR CRIMINAL, MUST BE SUBJECT TO A CIVIL
ACTION FOR DAMAGES; PERJURY SHOULD BE NO EXCEPTION

Any illegal action that results in harm is subject to a civil action for damages,
except perjury. Plaintiff is not asking that defendants be put in jail or
convicted in criminal court. Plaintiff asks only that Defendants remedy the
wrongful harm they have done.
The California Code of Civil Procedure §30 states, “A civil action is
prosecuted by one party against another for the declaration, enforcement or
protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong.” This suit asks
for the redress of a wrong and prevention of further harm to plaintiff caused
by the perjured court record and its consequences.
In addition, CCP §32 states, “When the violation of a right admits of both a
civil and criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the one is not merged in the
other.” The right to prosecute an offense in criminal court is separate from
the right to file an action in civil court. Plaintiff has no authority over criminal
court. Plaintiff does, however, have a right to prosecute this matter in civil
court.
If the truth had been told by defendants, plaintiff would have been reinstated
in her job, her good standing in the community would have been returned to
her, her financial losses would have been mitigated, and the case would have
been settled. It appears that GARVIN and CARLSON have no remorse, no
sense of guilt, and no apparent intention of changing their ways.
By poisoning the case, destroying the fairness of the proceedings, defendants
caused everyone who knows me, including people in northern California, to
believe that the heinous and false accusations against me, initiated by
Carlson, then spreading in a mass hysteria, were true.

III. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE FOUND THAT
PERJURED TESTIMONY CAN BE GROUNDS FOR
RELIEF

Federal Courts have decided that a demonstration of perjured testimony can
be grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(3). See Harre v. A.H. Robins, 750 F.2d
1501, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that perjury can constitute fraud
under Rule 60(b) (3)). The Commission has noted that fraudulent conduct
under Rule 60(b)(3) must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Secretary of Labor on behalf of Pena v. Eisenman Chem. Co., 11 FMSHRC
2166, 2167-68 (Nov. 1989) (denying miner's request for relief because it
failed to provide "clear and convincing evidence" of fraud or misconduct
where miner alleged that operator defrauded him in the settlement of his
discrimination suit); Wadding v. Tunnelton Mining Co., 8 FMSHRC 1142, 1143
(Aug. 1986) (finding that miner failed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) to provide
"clear and convincing evidence." In Metlyn Realty Corp. v. Esmark, Inc., 763
F.2d 826, 832 (7th Cir. 1985) the courts stated that an adverse party's fraud
or subornation of perjury permits relatively free reopening of the judgment
when the perjury goes to the heart of the issue.

IV. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS ARE CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE ATTACHED EXHIBITS AND
PROVIDE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE

Defendants claim, “The exhibits to the complaint conflict with the facts
alleged and do not support plaintiff’s causes of action. In truth, there is
absolutely NO conflict between the allegations and exhibits of plaintiff’s
complaint:
1. There WERE NO records about Maura Larkins in the CLETS database.
However, there were eight searches for “maura” or “larkins” in the CLETS
database in 2000 or 2001. When CARLSON was sued, he suborned his boss’s
perjury to cover up these searches. This is the basis of the present complaint.
2. There WERE police records at the San Diego Police Department about
Maura Larkins. Defendants have included these records in their own filings.
Plaintiff, on page 4, lines 20-22 of the present complaint alleged that Carlson
provided THESE SAN DIEGO POLICE RECORDS to his sister.
3. THE ABOVE TWO ALLEGATIONS ARE CLEARLY CONSISTENT WITH EACH
OTHER.
4. Sam Gross himself admitted in his letter (Exhibit 2) that his interpretation
of audits of the CLETS system was incorrect. Plaintiff’s exhibits, which
contain Sam Gross’s letter, are so devastatingly probative of plaintiff’s
allegations that plaintiff wonders if defendants are fully in tune with reality.
The declaration prepared by defendants sought, as defendants themselves
admit (demurrer, p. 2; lines 24-25), “The declaration was intended to show
that Carlson did not access the CLETS system and therefore could not have
known of plaintiff’s criminal history.” Defendants clearly intended to hide the
fact that there were EIGHT searches for Maura or Larkins. The declaration
also intentionally avoided including the audits for those EIGHT searches,
while claiming that they were included, in order to create a false document
for Sam Gross to sign. Indeed, the declaration seeks to cover up the truth by
cravenly throwing in two red herrings, the searches for “maura” AND
“larkins,” and the intentionally false claim that there were NO searches for
“maura” OR ‘larkins.”

V. PROPERLY INTERPRETTED CASE LAW, COMMON
LAW, AND STATUTORY FAIL TO SUPPORT THE
PUBLIC POLICY OF CIVIL IMMUNITY FOR ALL WHO
COMMIT PERJURY

Defendants are understandably upset and frustrated that did not get clean
away with subornation of perjury, but their identical demurrers have not one
speck of merit to them. Defendants’ demurrers must be overruled because
Plaintiff has pleaded her case correctly, and the current evidence proves the
truth of plaintiff’s allegations.

CONCLUSION

It should trigger a warning in our justice system when a lawyer and
a law enforcement officer both clearly believe that may commit
perjury without consequence.

Plaintiff respectfully asks the court to forward the proof provided in
this complaint of subornation of perjury by attorney Deborah K.
Garvin to the attorney discipline committee of the California State
Bar. Plaintiff heard GARVIN complaining early in the previous case
that GARVIN was tired of practicing law. This case should provide
the ticket to freedom that GARVIN has been waiting for.

Plaintiff requests that defendant’s identical demurrers be overruled.
Respectfully submitted,

February 1, 2007                _____________________________________
            MAURA LARKINS

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Education Report

SDER

San Diego Education Report

SDER

San Diego
Education Report

SDER

Warning: You shouldn't
file a lawsuit like this one
regarding perjury.
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE
GOVERNED BY CIVIL
CODE SECTION 47
This information is
provided to inform the
public about perjury
committed to hide
wrongdoing by public
entities. Perjury must
be challenged during
the case in which it
occurs, not in a
separate lawsuit.

Depositions

Robin Donlan

Peg Myers

Gina Boyd

(See also: more perjury
by Gina Boyd)

Linda Watson

Maura Larkins

Deborah Garvin
perjury in this case