| Bloggers take aim at city governments -- and hit home Some websites are watchdogs, others are just scurrilous... By Jonathan Abrams, Times Staff Writer The anonymous blogger posted documents on his website that, he said, showed that Mayor Maryetta Ferre and Mayor Pro Tem Lee Ann Garcia were beholden to developers putting up big-box stores such as Lowe's. "We need to recall them now," "Grandpa Terrace" fumed a year ago. "We don't want more traffic, more crime, dayworkers just to bring in some pocket change, when the cost to the city will go up to combat the problems brought by these types of development." His rants helped fuel a recall effort last year against the two council members. Although the campaign ultimately failed, his blog was another example of the growing influence of citizen journalists roiling communities across Southern California, many of which rarely are covered by newspapers or other traditional media outlets... It may only be a matter of time before bloggers start to have a major influence in local politics and policymaking... In Grand Terrace, the recall effort fell about 500 signatures short of the 1,506 needed to trigger the election. A citizen-driven group, buoyed by the blog, collected signatures at a Stater Bros. market and mailed petitions to residents. "For years the city of Grand Terrace tried to keep residents in the dark," said resident Jo Springfield, a strong supporter of the recall effort. "The blog enlightened many residents to start asking questions and going to meetings." Several bloggers interviewed by The Times insisted on anonymity, saying they feared a backlash from city officials. All said they were residents of the area they report on and got involved because their community did not receive enough coverage from the traditional media. "We want our words to stand on our own, and with anonymity, the only way someone can judge us is by what we write," said Publius of the Foothill Cities News Blog, who takes his pseudonym from the Roman whose name was used by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison when they wrote the Federalist Papers... The Foothill Cities Blog, which covers several cities in the San Gabriel Valley, was the first to report that Assemblywoman Nell Soto (D-Pomona) was absent from the Capitol for 25 days because of pneumonia. It was later reported that she still collected more than $20,000 in per diem pay... But the praise is mixed with criticism aimed at Pomona officials. The site drew the ire of administrators in May after posting that its city manager was forced to step down � which city officials said was untrue... Pomona City Atty. Arnold M. Alvarez-Glasman sent a cease-and-desist letter to the website, ordering it to remove the post. "While the City of Pomona strongly supports an individual's First Amendment Rights � it is difficult to respond to anonymous fabrications such as those published by you in your web-site publication," he wrote. The website took down the post but enlisted free-speech attorney Jean-Paul Jassy to respond. "In many ways, these kinds of sites are at the cutting edge and more modern vision of commentary," Jassy said. "The Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court placed a high premium on making sure freedom of speech is protected, especially when it comes to commenting on public officials." It is the anonymity that separates the bloggers from professional journalists, said Michael Parks, director of the journalism program at USC's Annenberg School for Communication. "Journalists need to accept responsibility for their reporting and comments, and that provides for them to be identified," said Parks, a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter who is a former editor of the Los Angeles Times. "Anonymous blogs are similar to writing something up, not signing it and putting it on a bulletin. It's more social commentary than anything." Although blogs are protected under the 1st Amendment, they are vulnerable to libel lawsuits, said Erwin Chemerinsky, a Duke University constitutional law professor. They present unique 1st Amendment challenges. "They cannot have defamatory speech any more than a traditional media type; however, the difficulty with an anonymous blog is who is actually doing the blogging?" he said. "And if you ask a server to take it down, what happens if they refuse?" Two years ago, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that an elected official who makes a defamation claim against an anonymous blogger must have substantial evidence to support the claim. Otherwise the lawsuit could not proceed and the blogger would remain masked. A similar case has yet to be heard in California. The California Supreme Court, however, ruled last year that Internet service providers and bloggers cannot be held liable for posting defamatory material written by someone else. The case was brought by two doctors who said they were defamed by a San Diego activist for victims of problem breast implants who called one doctor "arrogant and bizarre" and the other "a bully and a Nazi." In Claremont, former Mayor Diann Ring threatened the Claremont Insider blog with a defamation suit. The blog has criticized moves by the city's landscaping and lighting district assessments and targeted former city officials, including Ring, for contracting with a water agency outside the city... For all the furor the blogs create, city officials could take a cue from Fontana Mayor Mark Nuaimi. Nuaimi routinely posts on a blog in his city and said he welcomed it as a way to communicate with citizens... Los Angeles Times, July 23, 2007 http://www.watchourcities.4t.co m/ |
THOMAS C. EVANS, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LINDA A. EVANS, Defendant and Appellant
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
Filed 5/12/08D051144 (Super. Ct. No. GIC881162)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Patricia Cowett, Judge.
Reversed and remanded. Linda A. Evans, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Harrison Patterson & O'Connor and Harry W. Harrison for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Thomas Evans (Thomas), a deputy sheriff, sued his former wife, Linda Evans (Linda), and
Linda's mother, alleging numerous causes of action, including harassment, defamation,
and breach of privacy.
The court then granted Thomas's motion for preliminary injunction, and entered an order
enjoining Linda and her mother from: (1) publishing "false and defamatory statements"
about Thomas on the Internet; (2) publishing "confidential personal information" about
Thomas on the Internet; and (3) contacting Thomas's employer (the San Diego County
Sheriff's Department) "regarding [Thomas]" except to call "911 to report criminal conduct."
Linda appeals from the order, raising numerous contentions.
We conclude the preliminary injunction was overbroad
and constituted an invalid prior restraint before trial. We
thus reverse the order and remand for further hearing.
Our reversal should not be interpreted to mean that a court lacks authority to enjoin certain
speech and/or conduct. Before trial and upon a proper showing, a court may prohibit a party
from having contact with certain persons or from disclosing certain specified private
information under narrowly drawn circumstances. The order here, however, was not
sufficiently tailored to satisfy constitutional standards. Likewise, after a trial, a court may
continue these prohibitions and may additionally prohibit a party from repeating statements
determined at trial to be defamatory. We reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY1Thomas is a law enforcement officer with the
San Diego County Sheriff's Department. He and Linda were married in 1985, and separated
in 1998. In 2002, the court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage. During the next five
years, the parties had substantial ongoing conflict over custody, child support and other
issues. The family court has held numerous hearings, and those hearings continue
through the present time. In March 2007, Thomas filed a complaint against Linda, alleging
harassment (Code Civ. Proc, § 527.6), slander and defamation, various common law torts,
breach of privacy claims, and breach of contract. The gist of the allegations was that Linda
has engaged in a series of acts intended to harass Thomas and cause him severe
emotional stress and injury to his reputation and career. The complaint sought damages
and equitable relief...
DISCUSSION
In challenging the preliminary injunction, Linda raises numerous arguments. In Part I, we
conclude the order must be reversed because it is overbroad, vague, and an
unconstitutional prior restraint before trial. In Part II, we briefly address two of Linda's
additional challenges to the preliminary injunction and find them to be without merit. In
reaching these conclusions, we apply well-settled law applicable to preliminary injunctions.
To show entitlement to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must prove a likelihood of
prevailing on the merits, and that the harm to the plaintiff from not granting the injunction
outweighs the harm to the defendant if the injunction is issued pending trial. (Butt v. State of
California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677-678.)
"The trial court's determination must be guided by a 'mix' of the potential-merit and
interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on
the other to support an injunction." (Ibid.) ...
v.
LINDA A. EVANS, Defendant and Appellant
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION ONE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
Filed 5/12/08D051144 (Super. Ct. No. GIC881162)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Patricia Cowett, Judge.
Reversed and remanded. Linda A. Evans, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Harrison Patterson & O'Connor and Harry W. Harrison for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Thomas Evans (Thomas), a deputy sheriff, sued his former wife, Linda Evans (Linda), and
Linda's mother, alleging numerous causes of action, including harassment, defamation,
and breach of privacy.
The court then granted Thomas's motion for preliminary injunction, and entered an order
enjoining Linda and her mother from: (1) publishing "false and defamatory statements"
about Thomas on the Internet; (2) publishing "confidential personal information" about
Thomas on the Internet; and (3) contacting Thomas's employer (the San Diego County
Sheriff's Department) "regarding [Thomas]" except to call "911 to report criminal conduct."
Linda appeals from the order, raising numerous contentions.
We conclude the preliminary injunction was overbroad
and constituted an invalid prior restraint before trial. We
thus reverse the order and remand for further hearing.
Our reversal should not be interpreted to mean that a court lacks authority to enjoin certain
speech and/or conduct. Before trial and upon a proper showing, a court may prohibit a party
from having contact with certain persons or from disclosing certain specified private
information under narrowly drawn circumstances. The order here, however, was not
sufficiently tailored to satisfy constitutional standards. Likewise, after a trial, a court may
continue these prohibitions and may additionally prohibit a party from repeating statements
determined at trial to be defamatory. We reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY1Thomas is a law enforcement officer with the
San Diego County Sheriff's Department. He and Linda were married in 1985, and separated
in 1998. In 2002, the court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage. During the next five
years, the parties had substantial ongoing conflict over custody, child support and other
issues. The family court has held numerous hearings, and those hearings continue
through the present time. In March 2007, Thomas filed a complaint against Linda, alleging
harassment (Code Civ. Proc, § 527.6), slander and defamation, various common law torts,
breach of privacy claims, and breach of contract. The gist of the allegations was that Linda
has engaged in a series of acts intended to harass Thomas and cause him severe
emotional stress and injury to his reputation and career. The complaint sought damages
and equitable relief...
DISCUSSION
In challenging the preliminary injunction, Linda raises numerous arguments. In Part I, we
conclude the order must be reversed because it is overbroad, vague, and an
unconstitutional prior restraint before trial. In Part II, we briefly address two of Linda's
additional challenges to the preliminary injunction and find them to be without merit. In
reaching these conclusions, we apply well-settled law applicable to preliminary injunctions.
To show entitlement to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must prove a likelihood of
prevailing on the merits, and that the harm to the plaintiff from not granting the injunction
outweighs the harm to the defendant if the injunction is issued pending trial. (Butt v. State of
California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 677-678.)
"The trial court's determination must be guided by a 'mix' of the potential-merit and
interim-harm factors; the greater the plaintiff's showing on one, the less must be shown on
the other to support an injunction." (Ibid.) ...
Defamation law
| The Laconic Law Blog $3.5 Million Defamation Case Dismissed On Remand According to The VLW Blog, the Fairfax County Circuit Court has dismissed on remand the defamation claims of a former Raytheon executive who won one of the largest jury verdicts in Virginia in 2005. The VLW Blog reports: “Cynthia Hyland had been with defense contractor Raytheon Corporation for 21 years and served as a senior vice president prior to being fired in 2003 after the business unit she led lost money. In 2005, a Fairfax County jury awarded Hyland $3.5 million in a suit alleging the company president made defamatory remarks in Hyland’s performance evaluation. Fairfax Circuit Court Judge Arthur Vieregg reduced the $2 million punitive damage award to the statutory cap of $350,000, and the case went up on appeal. In March 2007, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed Hyland’s $1.85 million award, saying that only two of the five allegedly defamatory statements cited by Hyland could support the jury verdict. The justices sent the case back for another look at the factual accuracy of statements relating to Hyland’s role in the bidding process for two government contacts and her team’s being “off plan” on their financial targets. Last month, Vieregg granted summary judgment for Raytheon and its president in Hyland v. Raytheon Technical Services, saying Hyland admitted that she oversaw or was the project manager for the two government contracts at issue and was responsible for identified financial losses.” One lesson for employers to take from this case is to be sure that supervisors understand that performance evaluations need to be truthful. While Raytheon ultimately escaped liability for defamation here, untruthful statements made in a performance evaluation with actual malice can result in liability for defamation. |
Stutz Defamation suit
Depositions
Deposition of Ray Artiano
p 1-30
Deposition of Maura
Larkins
Notice of Dan Shinoff
Deposition
Dan Shinoff Public Figure
Deposition of Ray Artiano
p 1-30
Deposition of Maura
Larkins
Notice of Dan Shinoff
Deposition
Dan Shinoff Public Figure
Subpoenas
Sheriff of Santa Barbara
Diane Crosier
Sheriff of Santa Barbara
Diane Crosier
'Elated' nonlawyer triumphs before appellate
panel
In addition, the injunction on confidential personal information was too vague, Haller wrote.
She also said that banning contact with the Sheriff's Department was over-broad and
unconstitutional.
By Greg Moran
San Diego UNION-TRIBUNE
May 15, 2008
There's an old saying in the law – that representing yourself in court
means you have a fool for a client.
Don't tell that to Linda Evans.
[Maura Larkins comment: And don't tell it to Stutz, Artiano Shinoff &
Holtz, who are representing themselves in their defamation lawsuit
against me, Stutz v. Larkins.]
She not only represented herself, but did so at the appellate court
level.
The 50-year-old Jamul resident not only won her appeal, but the bulk
of the unanimous opinion from the 4th District Court of Appeal was
certified for publication
– meaning it can be cited as precedent around the state.
Most of the thousands of decisions of the appellate courts in the state are
deemed “unpublished,” meaning the decisions apply only to that case and
generally can't be relied on elsewhere.
Only about 8 percent of the appellate court decisions are deemed published.
“I'm absolutely elated,” Evans said. “I never thought I would get it reversed.”
A self-represented litigant winning a case and getting a published opinion is “a
rare event,” said Steve Kelly, the longtime clerk for the appellate court.
Evans appealed an April 2007 injunction issued by Superior Court
Judge Patricia Cowett preventing her from publishing allegedly false
and defamatory statements about her ex-husband on the Internet or
publishing any “confidential personal information” about him.
Her former husband, Thomas Evans, is a San Diego County deputy sheriff.
After the couple's divorce, he had sued her for harassment and defamation
and sought the injunction.
It was the latest in what the appellate court characterized as “substantial
ongoing conflict” in the couple's bitter divorce, which was finalized in 2002.
They married in 1985 and separated in 1998.
Cowett's order also prevented Linda Evans from contacting the San Diego
County Sheriff's Department except for calling 911 to report a crime.
Evans, who is unemployed and has applied for disability payments,
unsuccessfully contested the injunction before Cowett, representing herself
while her husband had a lawyer. She contended that the injunction was
an unconstitutional prior restraint on her free-speech rights, but
Cowett disagreed and issued the injunction.
At the appellate court, Evans used the court's guide for self-represented
people and received help from lawyers at the California Men's Center in San
Diego, which works on family law court issues, she said.
In the decision, Justice Judith Haller said the injunction was “constitutionally
invalid” and was too vague and overly broad. Courts can't prevent someone
from uttering a defamatory statement before a trial has been held to
determine whether the statement is defamatory, she said.
In addition, the injunction on confidential personal information was
too vague, Haller wrote. She also said that banning contact with the
Sheriff's Department was over-broad and unconstitutional.
Haller was careful to note that the court wasn't ruling on the merits of the
claims Thomas Evans made in seeking the injunction. Courts can issue such
an injunction, but only with a level of proof and only if the injunction is narrowly
drawn. The matter was sent back to reconsider the injunction in light of the
appellate decision.
Harry Harrison, whose law firm represented Thomas Evans, said the ruling
was one of “procedure over substance.” He said the court relied heavily on a
decision by the state Supreme Court that came out after the injunction was
issued.
Among other things, that decision said courts can prohibit people from making
defamatory statements, but only after a trial.
Linda Evans still faces a trial on the lawsuit and other legal issues. While it's a
tough road, she encourages others to followed her lead.
“You have to take the initiative to fight for your rights and your children's
rights,” she said.
Shaun Martin, a law professor at the University of San Diego who writes a blog
on appellate rulings, said the ruling reiterates that “injunctions against speech
are very disfavored.” Most free-speech cases are certified for publication
because the issue is of such importance, he said.
panel
In addition, the injunction on confidential personal information was too vague, Haller wrote.
She also said that banning contact with the Sheriff's Department was over-broad and
unconstitutional.
By Greg Moran
San Diego UNION-TRIBUNE
May 15, 2008
There's an old saying in the law – that representing yourself in court
means you have a fool for a client.
Don't tell that to Linda Evans.
[Maura Larkins comment: And don't tell it to Stutz, Artiano Shinoff &
Holtz, who are representing themselves in their defamation lawsuit
against me, Stutz v. Larkins.]
She not only represented herself, but did so at the appellate court
level.
The 50-year-old Jamul resident not only won her appeal, but the bulk
of the unanimous opinion from the 4th District Court of Appeal was
certified for publication
– meaning it can be cited as precedent around the state.
Most of the thousands of decisions of the appellate courts in the state are
deemed “unpublished,” meaning the decisions apply only to that case and
generally can't be relied on elsewhere.
Only about 8 percent of the appellate court decisions are deemed published.
“I'm absolutely elated,” Evans said. “I never thought I would get it reversed.”
A self-represented litigant winning a case and getting a published opinion is “a
rare event,” said Steve Kelly, the longtime clerk for the appellate court.
Evans appealed an April 2007 injunction issued by Superior Court
Judge Patricia Cowett preventing her from publishing allegedly false
and defamatory statements about her ex-husband on the Internet or
publishing any “confidential personal information” about him.
Her former husband, Thomas Evans, is a San Diego County deputy sheriff.
After the couple's divorce, he had sued her for harassment and defamation
and sought the injunction.
It was the latest in what the appellate court characterized as “substantial
ongoing conflict” in the couple's bitter divorce, which was finalized in 2002.
They married in 1985 and separated in 1998.
Cowett's order also prevented Linda Evans from contacting the San Diego
County Sheriff's Department except for calling 911 to report a crime.
Evans, who is unemployed and has applied for disability payments,
unsuccessfully contested the injunction before Cowett, representing herself
while her husband had a lawyer. She contended that the injunction was
an unconstitutional prior restraint on her free-speech rights, but
Cowett disagreed and issued the injunction.
At the appellate court, Evans used the court's guide for self-represented
people and received help from lawyers at the California Men's Center in San
Diego, which works on family law court issues, she said.
In the decision, Justice Judith Haller said the injunction was “constitutionally
invalid” and was too vague and overly broad. Courts can't prevent someone
from uttering a defamatory statement before a trial has been held to
determine whether the statement is defamatory, she said.
In addition, the injunction on confidential personal information was
too vague, Haller wrote. She also said that banning contact with the
Sheriff's Department was over-broad and unconstitutional.
Haller was careful to note that the court wasn't ruling on the merits of the
claims Thomas Evans made in seeking the injunction. Courts can issue such
an injunction, but only with a level of proof and only if the injunction is narrowly
drawn. The matter was sent back to reconsider the injunction in light of the
appellate decision.
Harry Harrison, whose law firm represented Thomas Evans, said the ruling
was one of “procedure over substance.” He said the court relied heavily on a
decision by the state Supreme Court that came out after the injunction was
issued.
Among other things, that decision said courts can prohibit people from making
defamatory statements, but only after a trial.
Linda Evans still faces a trial on the lawsuit and other legal issues. While it's a
tough road, she encourages others to followed her lead.
“You have to take the initiative to fight for your rights and your children's
rights,” she said.
Shaun Martin, a law professor at the University of San Diego who writes a blog
on appellate rulings, said the ruling reiterates that “injunctions against speech
are very disfavored.” Most free-speech cases are certified for publication
because the issue is of such importance, he said.
CRS/LII Annotated
Constitution First Amendment
Pfister92 the Court, after
expanding on First
Amendment grounds the
discretion of federal courts to
enjoin state court proceedings,
struck down as vague and as
... least of which are the Court's
subjection of defamation law to
First Amendment ... In United
States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) ...
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT DISTRICT OF
MASSACHUSETTS PAUL
MCMANN V. JOHN DOE
File Format: PDF/Adobe
Acrobat - Quick View
One district court in this circuit
has allowed the case to ....
broadcast media and striking
down an unconstitutionally
broad regulation of
cyberspace). .... figure
defamation cases. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 256 (1986). .... The
statement is so vague, that
attempting to judge its falsity,
...
United States v. Stevens (08-
769) | LII / Legal Information
Institute
The District Court sentenced
Stevens to thirty-seven months
of imprisonment. .... including
the “defamation” of religion
and depictions of criminal acts
in ... of free speech advocates
who view § 48 as an overly
broad and vague statute. ....
However, the United States
argues that several Supreme
Court cases held ...
Deciding communication law:
key cases in context
by Susan Dente Ross - 2004 -
Keefe, 402 US 415, 419
(1971). The District Court for
the Southern District ... [719]
The word "security" is a
broad, vague generality
whose contours should ...
...
Reno v. ACLU (1997)
The 1996 Communications
Decency Act was ruled
unconstitutional since it was
overly broad and vague in
its regulation of speech on the
Internet, and since it attempted
to regulate indecent speech,
which the First Amendment
protects.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT DISTRICT OF
COLORADO Case No. 04-B ...
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) . .....
Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo.
1991), and the hopelessly
vague and ambiguous
language of the ..... Hepps, of
course, was a case of civil
defamation, in which the
maximum penalty ...
Netlitigation | Background
Notes
In a second case interpreting
the CDA, Apollomedia Corp. v.
Reno, a three-judge panel of
the United States District Court
for the District of ... with an
intent to annoy was NOT
impermissibly broad and
vague in violation of the First
... was liable for defamatory
messages placed on its
service by a third party. ...
The Indiana Law Blog: Ind.
Decisions - Court of Appeals
issues 8 ...
Aug 21, 2009 ... Dugan first
contends that Komorowski's
statements are defamatory per
se. ... Finding that the statute is
not unconstitutionally vague as
...
indianalawblog.com/archives/...
/ind_decisions_c_1080.html -
State of Utah v. Ian Michael
Lake
Utah's Criminal Libel Statute is
Unconstitutionally Overbroad
and Vague. ... “Courts
uniformly have held criminal
defamation statutes
unconstitutional for ... For
example, we have consistently
allowed attacks on overly
broad statutes ...
www.acluutah.org/lakemotion.
htm -
#
RCFP: Criminal defamation
law upheld in Kansas cases
May 18, 2005 · A Kansas
criminal defamation law is not
unconstitutionally vague or
overly broad because the law
only punishes speech that can
be proven ...
www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.
php?i=4233 - Cached - Similar
-
#
Deciding communication law:
key cases in context - Google
Books Result
by Susan Dente Ross - 2004 -
Law - 352 pages
[719] The word "security" is a
broad, vague generality whose
contours should not be
invoked to abrogate the
fundamental law embodied in
the First Amendment ...
books.google.com/books?
isbn=0805846980... -
#
Canada, R v Lucas
298, 299 and 300 of the Code
are not so vague that they
infringe s. ... This portion of the
defamatory libel scheme is too
broad. ... freedom of
expression, the lower will be
the level of constitutional
protection afforded to it. ...
www.hrcr.
org/safrica/expression/r_lucas.
html - Cached - Similar -
#
Concurring Opinions » Is the
Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act ...
Is the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act Unconstitutionally
Vague? ... Since tort law is
common law, and is very
flexible, broad, and evolving
Human rights: group
defamation, freedom of
expression, and the law ...
by Thomas David Jones - 1998
- Political Science - 319 pages
Thus, the author's proposed
model statute, a true
defamation statute, ... The very
existence of these broad and
vague policy statements
creates a chilling ...
AETA 4: Animal Rights
Demonstrators Charged With
Unconstitutional ...
May 28, 2009 ... The AETA is so
broad and unclear it could be
used to suppress lawful
protests and ... chalking
defamatory comments on
public sidewalks, ... lawyers
say its language is so broad
and vague that it could be
easily used to ...
Constitution First Amendment
Pfister92 the Court, after
expanding on First
Amendment grounds the
discretion of federal courts to
enjoin state court proceedings,
struck down as vague and as
... least of which are the Court's
subjection of defamation law to
First Amendment ... In United
States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) ...
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT DISTRICT OF
MASSACHUSETTS PAUL
MCMANN V. JOHN DOE
File Format: PDF/Adobe
Acrobat - Quick View
One district court in this circuit
has allowed the case to ....
broadcast media and striking
down an unconstitutionally
broad regulation of
cyberspace). .... figure
defamation cases. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 256 (1986). .... The
statement is so vague, that
attempting to judge its falsity,
...
United States v. Stevens (08-
769) | LII / Legal Information
Institute
The District Court sentenced
Stevens to thirty-seven months
of imprisonment. .... including
the “defamation” of religion
and depictions of criminal acts
in ... of free speech advocates
who view § 48 as an overly
broad and vague statute. ....
However, the United States
argues that several Supreme
Court cases held ...
Deciding communication law:
key cases in context
by Susan Dente Ross - 2004 -
Keefe, 402 US 415, 419
(1971). The District Court for
the Southern District ... [719]
The word "security" is a
broad, vague generality
whose contours should ...
...
Reno v. ACLU (1997)
The 1996 Communications
Decency Act was ruled
unconstitutional since it was
overly broad and vague in
its regulation of speech on the
Internet, and since it attempted
to regulate indecent speech,
which the First Amendment
protects.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT DISTRICT OF
COLORADO Case No. 04-B ...
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) . .....
Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo.
1991), and the hopelessly
vague and ambiguous
language of the ..... Hepps, of
course, was a case of civil
defamation, in which the
maximum penalty ...
Netlitigation | Background
Notes
In a second case interpreting
the CDA, Apollomedia Corp. v.
Reno, a three-judge panel of
the United States District Court
for the District of ... with an
intent to annoy was NOT
impermissibly broad and
vague in violation of the First
... was liable for defamatory
messages placed on its
service by a third party. ...
The Indiana Law Blog: Ind.
Decisions - Court of Appeals
issues 8 ...
Aug 21, 2009 ... Dugan first
contends that Komorowski's
statements are defamatory per
se. ... Finding that the statute is
not unconstitutionally vague as
...
indianalawblog.com/archives/...
/ind_decisions_c_1080.html -
State of Utah v. Ian Michael
Lake
Utah's Criminal Libel Statute is
Unconstitutionally Overbroad
and Vague. ... “Courts
uniformly have held criminal
defamation statutes
unconstitutional for ... For
example, we have consistently
allowed attacks on overly
broad statutes ...
www.acluutah.org/lakemotion.
htm -
#
RCFP: Criminal defamation
law upheld in Kansas cases
May 18, 2005 · A Kansas
criminal defamation law is not
unconstitutionally vague or
overly broad because the law
only punishes speech that can
be proven ...
www.rcfp.org/newsitems/index.
php?i=4233 - Cached - Similar
-
#
Deciding communication law:
key cases in context - Google
Books Result
by Susan Dente Ross - 2004 -
Law - 352 pages
[719] The word "security" is a
broad, vague generality whose
contours should not be
invoked to abrogate the
fundamental law embodied in
the First Amendment ...
books.google.com/books?
isbn=0805846980... -
#
Canada, R v Lucas
298, 299 and 300 of the Code
are not so vague that they
infringe s. ... This portion of the
defamatory libel scheme is too
broad. ... freedom of
expression, the lower will be
the level of constitutional
protection afforded to it. ...
www.hrcr.
org/safrica/expression/r_lucas.
html - Cached - Similar -
#
Concurring Opinions » Is the
Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act ...
Is the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act Unconstitutionally
Vague? ... Since tort law is
common law, and is very
flexible, broad, and evolving
Human rights: group
defamation, freedom of
expression, and the law ...
by Thomas David Jones - 1998
- Political Science - 319 pages
Thus, the author's proposed
model statute, a true
defamation statute, ... The very
existence of these broad and
vague policy statements
creates a chilling ...
AETA 4: Animal Rights
Demonstrators Charged With
Unconstitutional ...
May 28, 2009 ... The AETA is so
broad and unclear it could be
used to suppress lawful
protests and ... chalking
defamatory comments on
public sidewalks, ... lawyers
say its language is so broad
and vague that it could be
easily used to ...
Gilbert v. Sykes
Del Junco v. Hufnagel
Public figures in Schools
Public figure Anti-SLAPP
Free Speech
Whistle-blowers
Del Junco v. Hufnagel
Public figures in Schools
Public figure Anti-SLAPP
Free Speech
Whistle-blowers
FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
GENERAL
Virginia v. Hicks (2003)
Richmond could ban non-
residents from public
housing complexes if the
non-residents did not
have “a legitimate
business or social
purpose” for being there.
The trespass policy was
not overbroad and did
not infringe upon First
Amendment rights.
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004)
The Child On-Line
Protection Act violated the
First Amendment because
it was overbroad, it
resulted in content-based
restrictions on speech,
and there were less-
restrictive options
available to protect
children from harmful
materials.
Watchtower Bible and
Tract Society v. Stratton
(2002)
City laws requiring permits
for political advocates
going door to door were
unconstitutional because
such a mandate would
have a “chilling
effect” on political
communication.
Schenck v. United States
(1919)
Freedom of speech can be
limited during wartime. The
government can restrict
expressions that “would
create a clear and present
danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to
prevent.”
Abrams v. United States
(1919)
The First Amendment did not
protect printing leaflets urging
to resist the war effort, calling
for a general strike and
advocating violent revolution
Debs v. United States (1919)
The First Amendment did not
protect an anti-war speech
designed to obstruct
recruiting.
Gitlow v. New York (1925)
The Supreme Court applied
protection of free speech to
the states through the due
process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
(1942)
The First Amendment did not
protect “fighting words” which,
by being said, cause injury or
cause an immediate breach
of the peace.
West Virginia v. Barnette
(1943)
The West Virginia Board’s
policy requiring students and
teachers to recite the Pledge
of Allegiance was
unconstitutional. Reversing
Minersville v. Gobitas (1940),
the Court held government
cannot “force citizens to
confess by word or act their
faith” in matters of opinion.
United States v. O’Brien
(1968)
The First Amendment did not
protect burning draft cards in
protest of the Vietnam War as
a form of symbolic speech.
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
The Court ruled that students
wearing black armbands to
protest the Vietnam War was
“pure speech,” or symbolic
speech protected by the First
Amendment.
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)
The Supreme Court held that
the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protected
speech advocating violence
at a Ku Klux Klan rally
because the speech did not
call for “imminent lawless
action.”
Cohen v. California(1971)
A California statute
prohibiting the display of
offensive messages violated
freedom of expression.
Miller v. California (1973)
This case set forth rules for
obscenity prosecutions, but it
also gave states and localities
flexibility in determining what
is obscene.
Island Trees School District v.
Pico (1982)
The Supreme Court ruled that
officials could not remove
books from school libraries
because they disagreed with
the content of the books’
messages.
Bethel School District v.
Fraser (1986)
A school could suspend a
pupil for giving a student
government nomination
speech full of “elaborate,
graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor.”
Texas v. Johnson (1989)
Flag burning as political
protest is a form of symbolic
speech protected by the First
Amendment.
R.A.V. v. St. Paul(1992)
A criminal ordinance
prohibiting the display of
symbols that “arouse anger,
alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender” was
unconstitutional. The law
violated the First Amendment
because it punished speech
based on the ideas
expressed.
Reno v. ACLU (1997)
The 1996 Communications
Decency Act was ruled
unconstitutional since it was
overly broad and vague in its
regulation of speech on the
Internet, and since it
attempted to regulate
indecent speech, which the
First Amendment protects.
United States v. American
Library Association (2003)
The federal government
could require public libraries
to use Internet-filtering
software to prevent viewing of
pornography by minors. The
burden placed on adult
patrons who had to request
the filters be disabled was
minimal.
Virginia v. Black (2003)
A blanket ban on cross-
burning was an
unconstitutional content-
based restriction on free
speech. States could ban
cross burning with intent to
intimidate, but the cross
burning act alone was not
enough evidence to infer
intent.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
“Reasonable restrictions” on
individual, corporate and
group contributions to
candidates were allowed;
limits on campaign
expenditures were
unconstitutional since these
placed “substantial and direct
restrictions” on protected
political expression.
Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. FEC
(1996)
The Court ruled that
campaign spending by
political parties on behalf of
congressional candidates
could not be limited as long
as the parties work
independently of the
candidates.
McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission (2003)
Limitations on “soft-
money” contributions and
political advertisements
were acceptable
infringements of free
speech because of the
government’s interest in
preventing corruption or
the appearance of
corruption in elections.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
COMMERCIAL
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council (1976)
A pharmacy had the First
Amendment right to advertise
prices.
Linmark v. Willingboro (1977)
A town prohibition on “For
Sale” and “Sold” signs was
unconstitutional. The ban was
unreasonable restriction on
the flow of commercial
information.
United States v. United Foods
(2001)
A law forcing cooperatives of
mushroom growers to pay
advertising fees was “contrary
to First Amendment
principles” as a form of
compelled speech.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Rex v. Zenger (1735)
The colony of New York tried
publisher John Peter Zenger
for seditious libel against the
governor. At that time, truth
was not a defense in a
libel case. Zenger’s attorney
told the jury of their power
and duty to judge the law as
well as the facts, and the jury
acquitted Zenger. Though not
a Supreme Court case, this is
a landmark freedom of the
press case.
People v. Croswell (1804)
Harry Croswell was convicted
of libel for printing a story
critical of President Thomas
Jefferson in his newspaper.
Alexander Hamilton
represented Croswell on
appeal and argued that truth
should be a defense for libel.
Croswell’s conviction was
upheld, but the case led New
York to change its law to
permit truth as a defense.
Though not a Supreme Court
case, this is a landmark
freedom of the press case.
Near v. Minnesota (1931)
A state law allowing prior
restraint was unconstitutional.
This decision also extended
protection of press freedom
to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
New York Times v. Sullivan
(1964)
The First Amendment
protected all statements
about public officials unless
the speaker lied with the
intent to defame.
Garrison v. Louisiana (1964)
A Louisiana law that punished
true statements made with
“actual malice” was
overturned. The Court ruled
that unless a newspaper
shows “reckless disregard for
the truth,” it is protected
under the First Amendment.
Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts and AP v. Walker
(1967)
A “public figure” who is
not a public official may
recover damages for a
defamatory falsehood what
harms his or her reputation, if
the newspaper’s actions were
an “extreme departure” of the
standards of reporting.
New York Times v. United
States (1971)
A claimed threat to national
security was not justification
for prior restraint on
publication of classified
documents (the Pentagon
Papers) about the Vietnam
War.
Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart (1976)
A judge’s order that the
media not publish or
broadcast statements by
police in a murder trial was an
unconstitutional prior
restraint. The gag order
violated the First Amendment
rights of the press and the
community.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting (1977)
The Court ruled that the First
Amendment does not give a
television station to right to air
the entire act of a
performance without the
performer’s permission.
Hustler v. Falwell (1988)
The First Amendment
prohibits public figures from
recovering damages for
intentional infliction of
emotional harm unless the
publication contained a false
statement made with actual
malice.
Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier (1988)
Public school officials can
censor school-sponsored
newspapers, because the
newspapers are part of the
school curriculum rather than
a forum for public expression.
Top
FREEDOM OF
ASSEMBLY/ASSOCIATION
Dejonge v. Oregon (1937)
Federal protection of the right
of peaceful assembly for
lawful discussion was
extended to the states.
NAACP v. Alabama (1958)
An Alabama law requiring
associations to disclose their
membership lists was struck
down. This requirement would
suppress legal association
among the group’s members.
Edwards v. South Carolina
(1963)
The convictions of students
arrested for peaceful
demonstrations against
segregation were overturned
because the state could not
“make criminal the peaceful
expression of unpopular
views.”
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner
(1972)
Shopping mall owners may
prohibit demonstrators from
assembling in their private
malls since the First
Amendment applies to public,
not private property.
Village of Skokie vs. National
Socialist Party (1978)
The National Socialist (Nazi)
Party could not be prohibited
from marching peacefully
because of the content of
their message.
Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte (1987)
California state law requiring
Rotary Clubs to admit women
was constitutional. Because
women members would not
prevent the group from
accomplishing its goals, the
Court held that the state’s
compelling interest in ending
sexual discrimination
outweighed the infringement
on the group’s right of
association.
Madsen v. Women’s Health
Clinic (1994)
Some restrictions on
protesters at a Florida
abortion clinic, including limits
on noise amplification and a
required buffer zone, did not
violate the First Amendment.
The restrictions that “burden
[ed] no more speech than
necessary” to protect access
to the clinic and ensure
orderly traffic flow on the
street were upheld. The
restrictions that burdened
“more speech than
necessary” and were struck
down.
Hurley v. Irish American GLIB
Association (1995)
Forcing a privately-organized
parade to include homosexual
and bisexual groups would be
a form of coerced speech and
violated the organizers’ First
Amendment rights.
Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of Western New York
(1997)
”Fixed buffers” around
abortion clinics were
constitutional since they
protected the government’s
interest in protecting private
property and preventing
illegal activity. A fifteen-foot
“floating buffer” around
patients leaving or entering
an abortion clinic was struck
down as an infringement of
the protestors’ First
Amendment rights.
Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale (2000)
Forcing the Boy Scouts to
admit a gay scout leader
would violate the private
organization’s rights to
freedom of association and
expressive association.
FREEDOM OF PETITION
NAACP v. Button (1963)
States could not stop the
NAACP from soliciting people
to serve as litigants in federal
court cases challenging
segregation.
Meyer v. Grant (1988)
States could not bar groups
from hiring individuals who
circulate petitions in support
of a ballot measure.
Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law
Foundation (1999)
The Court ruled that states
could not require petition
circulators to be registered
voters, wear name badges, or
disclose information about
themselves and their salaries.
GENERAL
Virginia v. Hicks (2003)
Richmond could ban non-
residents from public
housing complexes if the
non-residents did not
have “a legitimate
business or social
purpose” for being there.
The trespass policy was
not overbroad and did
not infringe upon First
Amendment rights.
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004)
The Child On-Line
Protection Act violated the
First Amendment because
it was overbroad, it
resulted in content-based
restrictions on speech,
and there were less-
restrictive options
available to protect
children from harmful
materials.
Watchtower Bible and
Tract Society v. Stratton
(2002)
City laws requiring permits
for political advocates
going door to door were
unconstitutional because
such a mandate would
have a “chilling
effect” on political
communication.
Schenck v. United States
(1919)
Freedom of speech can be
limited during wartime. The
government can restrict
expressions that “would
create a clear and present
danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to
prevent.”
Abrams v. United States
(1919)
The First Amendment did not
protect printing leaflets urging
to resist the war effort, calling
for a general strike and
advocating violent revolution
Debs v. United States (1919)
The First Amendment did not
protect an anti-war speech
designed to obstruct
recruiting.
Gitlow v. New York (1925)
The Supreme Court applied
protection of free speech to
the states through the due
process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
(1942)
The First Amendment did not
protect “fighting words” which,
by being said, cause injury or
cause an immediate breach
of the peace.
West Virginia v. Barnette
(1943)
The West Virginia Board’s
policy requiring students and
teachers to recite the Pledge
of Allegiance was
unconstitutional. Reversing
Minersville v. Gobitas (1940),
the Court held government
cannot “force citizens to
confess by word or act their
faith” in matters of opinion.
United States v. O’Brien
(1968)
The First Amendment did not
protect burning draft cards in
protest of the Vietnam War as
a form of symbolic speech.
Tinker v. Des Moines (1969)
The Court ruled that students
wearing black armbands to
protest the Vietnam War was
“pure speech,” or symbolic
speech protected by the First
Amendment.
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)
The Supreme Court held that
the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protected
speech advocating violence
at a Ku Klux Klan rally
because the speech did not
call for “imminent lawless
action.”
Cohen v. California(1971)
A California statute
prohibiting the display of
offensive messages violated
freedom of expression.
Miller v. California (1973)
This case set forth rules for
obscenity prosecutions, but it
also gave states and localities
flexibility in determining what
is obscene.
Island Trees School District v.
Pico (1982)
The Supreme Court ruled that
officials could not remove
books from school libraries
because they disagreed with
the content of the books’
messages.
Bethel School District v.
Fraser (1986)
A school could suspend a
pupil for giving a student
government nomination
speech full of “elaborate,
graphic, and explicit sexual
metaphor.”
Texas v. Johnson (1989)
Flag burning as political
protest is a form of symbolic
speech protected by the First
Amendment.
R.A.V. v. St. Paul(1992)
A criminal ordinance
prohibiting the display of
symbols that “arouse anger,
alarm or resentment in others
on the basis of race, color,
creed, religion or gender” was
unconstitutional. The law
violated the First Amendment
because it punished speech
based on the ideas
expressed.
Reno v. ACLU (1997)
The 1996 Communications
Decency Act was ruled
unconstitutional since it was
overly broad and vague in its
regulation of speech on the
Internet, and since it
attempted to regulate
indecent speech, which the
First Amendment protects.
United States v. American
Library Association (2003)
The federal government
could require public libraries
to use Internet-filtering
software to prevent viewing of
pornography by minors. The
burden placed on adult
patrons who had to request
the filters be disabled was
minimal.
Virginia v. Black (2003)
A blanket ban on cross-
burning was an
unconstitutional content-
based restriction on free
speech. States could ban
cross burning with intent to
intimidate, but the cross
burning act alone was not
enough evidence to infer
intent.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
“Reasonable restrictions” on
individual, corporate and
group contributions to
candidates were allowed;
limits on campaign
expenditures were
unconstitutional since these
placed “substantial and direct
restrictions” on protected
political expression.
Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. FEC
(1996)
The Court ruled that
campaign spending by
political parties on behalf of
congressional candidates
could not be limited as long
as the parties work
independently of the
candidates.
McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission (2003)
Limitations on “soft-
money” contributions and
political advertisements
were acceptable
infringements of free
speech because of the
government’s interest in
preventing corruption or
the appearance of
corruption in elections.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
COMMERCIAL
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council (1976)
A pharmacy had the First
Amendment right to advertise
prices.
Linmark v. Willingboro (1977)
A town prohibition on “For
Sale” and “Sold” signs was
unconstitutional. The ban was
unreasonable restriction on
the flow of commercial
information.
United States v. United Foods
(2001)
A law forcing cooperatives of
mushroom growers to pay
advertising fees was “contrary
to First Amendment
principles” as a form of
compelled speech.
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
Rex v. Zenger (1735)
The colony of New York tried
publisher John Peter Zenger
for seditious libel against the
governor. At that time, truth
was not a defense in a
libel case. Zenger’s attorney
told the jury of their power
and duty to judge the law as
well as the facts, and the jury
acquitted Zenger. Though not
a Supreme Court case, this is
a landmark freedom of the
press case.
People v. Croswell (1804)
Harry Croswell was convicted
of libel for printing a story
critical of President Thomas
Jefferson in his newspaper.
Alexander Hamilton
represented Croswell on
appeal and argued that truth
should be a defense for libel.
Croswell’s conviction was
upheld, but the case led New
York to change its law to
permit truth as a defense.
Though not a Supreme Court
case, this is a landmark
freedom of the press case.
Near v. Minnesota (1931)
A state law allowing prior
restraint was unconstitutional.
This decision also extended
protection of press freedom
to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.
New York Times v. Sullivan
(1964)
The First Amendment
protected all statements
about public officials unless
the speaker lied with the
intent to defame.
Garrison v. Louisiana (1964)
A Louisiana law that punished
true statements made with
“actual malice” was
overturned. The Court ruled
that unless a newspaper
shows “reckless disregard for
the truth,” it is protected
under the First Amendment.
Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts and AP v. Walker
(1967)
A “public figure” who is
not a public official may
recover damages for a
defamatory falsehood what
harms his or her reputation, if
the newspaper’s actions were
an “extreme departure” of the
standards of reporting.
New York Times v. United
States (1971)
A claimed threat to national
security was not justification
for prior restraint on
publication of classified
documents (the Pentagon
Papers) about the Vietnam
War.
Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart (1976)
A judge’s order that the
media not publish or
broadcast statements by
police in a murder trial was an
unconstitutional prior
restraint. The gag order
violated the First Amendment
rights of the press and the
community.
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting (1977)
The Court ruled that the First
Amendment does not give a
television station to right to air
the entire act of a
performance without the
performer’s permission.
Hustler v. Falwell (1988)
The First Amendment
prohibits public figures from
recovering damages for
intentional infliction of
emotional harm unless the
publication contained a false
statement made with actual
malice.
Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier (1988)
Public school officials can
censor school-sponsored
newspapers, because the
newspapers are part of the
school curriculum rather than
a forum for public expression.
Top
FREEDOM OF
ASSEMBLY/ASSOCIATION
Dejonge v. Oregon (1937)
Federal protection of the right
of peaceful assembly for
lawful discussion was
extended to the states.
NAACP v. Alabama (1958)
An Alabama law requiring
associations to disclose their
membership lists was struck
down. This requirement would
suppress legal association
among the group’s members.
Edwards v. South Carolina
(1963)
The convictions of students
arrested for peaceful
demonstrations against
segregation were overturned
because the state could not
“make criminal the peaceful
expression of unpopular
views.”
Lloyd Corporation v. Tanner
(1972)
Shopping mall owners may
prohibit demonstrators from
assembling in their private
malls since the First
Amendment applies to public,
not private property.
Village of Skokie vs. National
Socialist Party (1978)
The National Socialist (Nazi)
Party could not be prohibited
from marching peacefully
because of the content of
their message.
Rotary International v. Rotary
Club of Duarte (1987)
California state law requiring
Rotary Clubs to admit women
was constitutional. Because
women members would not
prevent the group from
accomplishing its goals, the
Court held that the state’s
compelling interest in ending
sexual discrimination
outweighed the infringement
on the group’s right of
association.
Madsen v. Women’s Health
Clinic (1994)
Some restrictions on
protesters at a Florida
abortion clinic, including limits
on noise amplification and a
required buffer zone, did not
violate the First Amendment.
The restrictions that “burden
[ed] no more speech than
necessary” to protect access
to the clinic and ensure
orderly traffic flow on the
street were upheld. The
restrictions that burdened
“more speech than
necessary” and were struck
down.
Hurley v. Irish American GLIB
Association (1995)
Forcing a privately-organized
parade to include homosexual
and bisexual groups would be
a form of coerced speech and
violated the organizers’ First
Amendment rights.
Schenck v. Pro-Choice
Network of Western New York
(1997)
”Fixed buffers” around
abortion clinics were
constitutional since they
protected the government’s
interest in protecting private
property and preventing
illegal activity. A fifteen-foot
“floating buffer” around
patients leaving or entering
an abortion clinic was struck
down as an infringement of
the protestors’ First
Amendment rights.
Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale (2000)
Forcing the Boy Scouts to
admit a gay scout leader
would violate the private
organization’s rights to
freedom of association and
expressive association.
FREEDOM OF PETITION
NAACP v. Button (1963)
States could not stop the
NAACP from soliciting people
to serve as litigants in federal
court cases challenging
segregation.
Meyer v. Grant (1988)
States could not bar groups
from hiring individuals who
circulate petitions in support
of a ballot measure.
Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law
Foundation (1999)
The Court ruled that states
could not require petition
circulators to be registered
voters, wear name badges, or
disclose information about
themselves and their salaries.
Cases and Links
Why This Website
Stutz Artiano Shinoff
& Holtz v. Maura
Larkins defamation
SDCOE
CVESD
Castle Park
Elementary School
Law Enforcement
CTA
CVE
Stutz Artiano Shinoff
& Holtz
Silence is Golden
Schools and Violence
Office Admin Hearings
Larkins OAH Hearing
Stutz Artiano Shinoff
& Holtz v. Maura
Larkins defamation
SDCOE
CVESD
Castle Park
Elementary School
Law Enforcement
CTA
CVE
Stutz Artiano Shinoff
& Holtz
Silence is Golden
Schools and Violence
Office Admin Hearings
Larkins OAH Hearing
Finkel v. Facebook
Posted March 3rd, 2009 by CMLP Staff
Threat Type: Lawsuit Date: 02/16/2009
Status: Concluded Location: New York
Disposition: Dismissed (total) Verdict/Settlement Amount: n/a
Legal Claims: Defamation; Negligence
Teenager Denise Finkel sued four of her former high school classmates, their
parents, and Facebook after the students created a private Facebook group
called "90 Cents Short of a Dollar," which allegedly contained false and
defamatory statements about her. The complaint alleges... read full description
Parties
Party Issuing Legal Threat: Party Receiving Legal Threat:
Denise E. Finkel Facebook, Inc.; Michael Dauber; Jeffrey Schwartz;
Melinda Danowitz; Leah Herz; Richard Dauber; Amy Schwartz; Elliott Schwartz;
Martin Danowitz; Bari Danowitz; Alan Herz; Ellen Herz
Type of Party: Type of Party:
Individual Individual; Large Organization
Location of Party: Location of Party:
New York New York
Legal Counsel: Legal Counsel:
Mark Altschul - Altschul & Altschul Lisa T. Simpson and Aaron G.R. Rubin -
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (for Facebook); Lina C. Rossillo - Morris
Duffy Alonso & Faley (for Elliot, Jeffrey, and Amy Schwartz)
Description
Teenager Denise Finkel sued four of her former high school classmates, their
parents, and Facebook after the students created a private Facebook group
called "90 Cents Short of a Dollar," which allegedly contained false and
defamatory statements about her.
The complaint alleges that statements appearing on the private Facebook
group asserted or implied that she "was a woman of dubious morals, dubious
sexual character, having engaged in bestiality, an 'IV drug user' as well as
having contracted the H.I.V. virus and AIDS." Cmplt. ¶ 23. The postings are
attached as an exhibit to the complaint.
The complaint alleges that Facebook should be held liable for publishing the
defamatory matter, explaining that it "should have known that such statements
were false and/or have taken steps to verify the genuineness" of the
statements. Id. ¶ 28.
The complaint also alleges that the students' parents are liable for negligently
failing to supervise their children.
Update:
9/15/09 - Court granted Facebook's motion to dismiss, finding that Facebook is
immune from liability under Section 230 of the CDA. Court rejects plaintiff's
argument that Facebook's Terms of Use which grant it an "ownership interest"
in the allegedy defamatory content makes Section 230 inapplicable.
7/22/10 - After removal to state court, state judge dismissed the remaining
claims, writing that, "Taken together, the statements can only be read as
puerile attempts by adolescents to outdo each other" (slip op. at 7).
Posted March 3rd, 2009 by CMLP Staff
Threat Type: Lawsuit Date: 02/16/2009
Status: Concluded Location: New York
Disposition: Dismissed (total) Verdict/Settlement Amount: n/a
Legal Claims: Defamation; Negligence
Teenager Denise Finkel sued four of her former high school classmates, their
parents, and Facebook after the students created a private Facebook group
called "90 Cents Short of a Dollar," which allegedly contained false and
defamatory statements about her. The complaint alleges... read full description
Parties
Party Issuing Legal Threat: Party Receiving Legal Threat:
Denise E. Finkel Facebook, Inc.; Michael Dauber; Jeffrey Schwartz;
Melinda Danowitz; Leah Herz; Richard Dauber; Amy Schwartz; Elliott Schwartz;
Martin Danowitz; Bari Danowitz; Alan Herz; Ellen Herz
Type of Party: Type of Party:
Individual Individual; Large Organization
Location of Party: Location of Party:
New York New York
Legal Counsel: Legal Counsel:
Mark Altschul - Altschul & Altschul Lisa T. Simpson and Aaron G.R. Rubin -
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP (for Facebook); Lina C. Rossillo - Morris
Duffy Alonso & Faley (for Elliot, Jeffrey, and Amy Schwartz)
Description
Teenager Denise Finkel sued four of her former high school classmates, their
parents, and Facebook after the students created a private Facebook group
called "90 Cents Short of a Dollar," which allegedly contained false and
defamatory statements about her.
The complaint alleges that statements appearing on the private Facebook
group asserted or implied that she "was a woman of dubious morals, dubious
sexual character, having engaged in bestiality, an 'IV drug user' as well as
having contracted the H.I.V. virus and AIDS." Cmplt. ¶ 23. The postings are
attached as an exhibit to the complaint.
The complaint alleges that Facebook should be held liable for publishing the
defamatory matter, explaining that it "should have known that such statements
were false and/or have taken steps to verify the genuineness" of the
statements. Id. ¶ 28.
The complaint also alleges that the students' parents are liable for negligently
failing to supervise their children.
Update:
9/15/09 - Court granted Facebook's motion to dismiss, finding that Facebook is
immune from liability under Section 230 of the CDA. Court rejects plaintiff's
argument that Facebook's Terms of Use which grant it an "ownership interest"
in the allegedy defamatory content makes Section 230 inapplicable.
7/22/10 - After removal to state court, state judge dismissed the remaining
claims, writing that, "Taken together, the statements can only be read as
puerile attempts by adolescents to outdo each other" (slip op. at 7).
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